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Abstract
In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs) the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires
that merchants charge the same nal good price regardless of the means of payment
chosen by the customer. In this paper, we analyze a three-party model (consumers,
merchants, and proprietary EPNs) to assess the impact of a NSR on the electronic
payments system, in particular, on competition among EPNs, network pricing to
merchants and consumers, EPNsprots, and social welfare.
We show that imposing a NSR has a number of e¤ects. First, it softens competition
among EPNs and rebalances the fee structure in favor of cardholders and to the
detriment of merchants. Second, we show that the NSR is a protable strategy for
EPNs if and only if the network e¤ect from merchants to cardholders is su¢ ciently
weak. Third, the NSR is socially (un)desirable if the network externalities from
merchants to cardholders are su¢ ciently weak (strong) and the merchantsmarket
power in the goods market is su¢ ciently high (low). Our policy advice is that
regulators should decide on whether the NSR is appropriate on a market-by-market
basis instead of imposing a uniform regulation for all markets.
Keywords: Electronic Payment System, Market Power, Network Externalities, No-
Surcharge Rule, Regulation, Two-sided Markets, MasterCard, Visa, American Express,
Discover.
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1 Introduction
The No-Surcharge Rule (NSR). The NSR means that a merchant charges at most
the same amount for a payment card1 transaction as for cash. If the merchant decides to
apply a discount for payments in cash that discount cannot be extended to any specic
card brand. If a merchant wants to o¤er a discount to a given card brand, then he must
extend it to all the other comparable card brands.2 Economides (2009) compares the
NSR as if Coca-Cola were to impose the requirement that a can of Pepsi be sold at the
same price as a can of Coke, which would enhance the incentives for collusive behavior
among companies.
Payment cards have been experiencing fast growth which has drawn attention to some
of the contentious features of this industry, namely the NSR.3 In several countries, the NSR
has been under examination by regulatory and competition authorities, central banks and
courts. For example, in the U.S., on October 5th, 2010, Visa and MasterCard reached a
settlement with the U.S. DOJ that allows merchants to reward consumers for paying with
credit or debit cards that charge the merchant lower fees, while American Express Co.
(AmEx) vowed to ght a government antitrust lawsuit.4 In early 2010, the Portuguese
Government decided to make the NSR mandatory by law claiming consumer protection
and that the use of electronic payments is more e¢ cient than cash and thus should be
protected. In other countries, such as Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, the NSR has been abolished (Prager et al., 2009). Critics of the NSR have
claimed that it ine¢ ciently encourages the use of more costly forms of payment (credit
cards) over the less costly (cash), as well as more costly credit cards compared to less
costly credit cards, leading to a Greshams Law of Payments.
Description of the paper: goals and results. In this paper, we investigate the
impact of the NSR on competition and pricing among proprietary Electronic Payment
Networks (EPNs), on EPNsprots and on social welfare. We also provide insights on
the desirability of laws and contractual rules about surcharging payment cards. We base
1The payment cards industry includes credit, debit, and prepaid cards. For the purposes of this paper,
we do not distinguish among types of payment cards.
2Although infrequent, there have been cases where card payments were discounted relatively to cash,
e.g. in Germany during the transition to the euro. Also in Argentina and Colombia since 2003 Govern-
ments have been providing VAT discounts to transactions processed with debit or credit cards.
3Transactions done on electronic payment networks in the U.S. exceeded $1.7 trillion in 2002 (Schwartz
& Vincent, 2004). In 2006, payment cards were used in 47 billion transactions for a total of $3.1 trillion
(Shy & Wang, 2010). In 2008, debit and prepaid card purchases topped $3.285 trillion (almost a quarter
of U.S. GDP).
4SeeMasterCard, Visa Settle as Amex Fights U.S. Lawsuit, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-10-04/mastercard-visa-settle-antitrust-case-as-american-express-fights-lawsuit.
html.
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our analysis on a three-party model, as described in gure 1,5 with consumers, merchants
and prot-maximizing EPNs setting fees to both merchants and cardholders.6
Figure 1: A three-party card network. See Economides (2009) for further details.
We start by deriving a series of results with elasticities characterizing the platform
optimal pricing conditions with surcharge, and then examine the NSRs impact on the
elasticities. We show that: (i) the platforms prot maximization problem can be de-
composed in two parts: setting a total fee, i.e., the sum of the merchant fee with the
cardholder average fee per transaction, and setting relative fees, i.e., which fraction of the
total fee is paid by each type of end-user; (ii) consumers demand for electronic payment
services become less elastic with respect to merchant fees under the NSR; and (iii) the
total fee is inated under the NSR.
In our second set of results, we derive and compare the EPN pricing and prot in
the market equilibrium under surcharge versus under the NSR. We show that the NSR
implementation (i) rebalances the fee structure in favor of cardholders and (ii) increases
EPNsprots if and only if the network e¤ect exerted by the number of merchants on
cardholdersutility is su¢ ciently weak. In a nutshell, the reasoning for these ndings is
as follows. The NSR makes cardholders less sensitive to merchant fees since merchant
fee di¤erences among EPNs cannot be translated into purchase price di¤erences. Hence
EPNs competition is softer in the merchant side of the market under the NSR. As a result,
merchant fees rise and the number of merchants accepting electronic transactions declines.
Since cardholders are sensitive to the number of merchants accepting card payments (the
network e¤ect), EPNs will then reduce membership fees. Moreover, if the network e¤ect
is su¢ ciently strong, cardholdersdemand will sharply decline with the reduction on the
number of merchants and EPNsprots will decline.
5In this example, AmEx chooses to charge the merchant a $3 fee for the $100 transaction, while
cardholders do not pay any per transaction fee but may have to pay a membership fee. Note that the
merchant receives a net value of $97(=$100 $3), that is, the purchase value discounted from the merchant
fee.
6Our analysis primarily addresses a closed network, but it may also characterize a four-party network
if acquirers (issuers) are identical and perfectly competitive, while issuers (acquirers) are identical and
collude when setting the fees to cardholders (merchants). One advantage of a three-party model is that
we do not need to be concerned with the interchange fee (IF), which, in a four-party setup compensates
the issuing bank each time cardholders use the card in a purchase.
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In the welfare analysis, we analyze the NSRs impact on the number of end-users
of the electronic payment system and on the purchase price. We show that the NSR
reduces payment card acceptance by merchants, expands the number of cardholders and
raises the equilibrium price in the goods market. We close the set of welfare results with
the surplus variations that the NSR implies to each group of end-users and to society
as a whole. We show under which conditions the society is better o¤ with the NSR
implementation. The NSR will be socially (un)desirable if network e¤ects from merchants
to cardholders are su¢ ciently weak (strong) and merchants market power in the goods
market is su¢ ciently high (low). In our framework, the NSR implementation raises the
merchant fee and consequently reduces card acceptance. Thus, on the one hand, if network
e¤ects on cardholdersutility are strong, the NSR destroys value in the cardholder side
of the market. This is the case provided that the network size of card acceptance matters
to cardholders and, according to previous results, under the NSR fewer stores accept
payment cards. On the other hand, if merchantsmarket power in the goods market
is su¢ ciently high (e.g., under a monopoly) the price in the goods market is essentially
dened by consumer willingness-to-pay. Thus, the increase in merchant fees (marginal
cost of selling the good) due to the NSR is not passed-through to the purchase price of
the good, but cardholders benet because of a discount (or reward) on the cardholder
fees. In this case, the NSR accomplishes implicitly the task of partially correcting the
merchantsmarket power distortion in the goods market.
We conclude the paper by discussing policy considerations and possible interventions
on the electronic payment system with regard to the NSR imposition. We consider the
pros and cons of forbidding the NSR versus no regulatory intervention emphasizing that
one size policy does not t all markets, since, in general, there are signicant market power
di¤erences across goods and geographic markets within the same country. According to
our welfare results, regulators should take into account the merchantsmarket power in
the goods and geographic markets and the extent of network e¤ects and decide on the
NSR on a market-by-market basis instead of imposing a rule common to all markets.
Background. Formal economic analysis of electronic payment systems was initiated by
Baxter (1983) with an analysis of the NaBanCo litigation.7 The theoretical payment card
literature has been growing, especially during the last decade, by addressing the issue
of how costs of payment cards are and might be divided among EPNs, merchants and
cardholders. The models considered in this literature point out that EPNs may charge fees
signicantly in excess of their costs to merchants and provide incentives to cardholders to
increase card adoption and usage. To a great extent, this literature has not distinguished
prepaid cards from debit or credit cards. Usually these models (e.g., Rochet & Tirole
7See Frankel & Shampine (2006) for a summary on the NaBanCo case (National Bancard Corporation
vs. Visa U.S. Inc.).
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(R&T) (2002, 2003), Cabral (2006), Wright (2010)) focus on the adoption and usage of
payment cards versus all other payment instruments and have showed that competition
levels among merchants and among EPNs, along with consumer and merchant demand
elasticities, are relevant factors in determining model outcomes.8
EPNs are a type of two-sided markets. The two-sided markets literature has been
employed to investigate the structure of fees paid by cardholders and merchants. This
strand of literature combines the network economics literature, which studies how agents
utility changes with participation of other agents in the network, and the multiproduct
rm literature, which investigates how rms choose prices when o¤ering more than one
product.
The seminal articles in two-sided markets by R&T (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006)
investigate the determinants of the price balance between two groups of end-users (e.g.,
consumers and merchants) when each group exerts a network e¤ect on the other, and both
are intermediated by a platform (e.g., an EPN). Some of the discussed determinants of
the price balance are: the possibility of multi-homing (access to more than one platform),
platform di¤erentiation, presence of same-side externalities, platform compatibility, per-
transaction or lump-sum pricing and relative size of cross-group externalities. However,
as far as we know, the two-sided markets literature has been silent about the NSR im-
plications on platform fees, prots and welfare, since it assumes that end-users are not
allowed to negotiate prices of platform services.
Chakravorti & Roson (2006) compare the welfare level when two networks operate
as competitors and as a cartel. One of their ndings corroborates the conclusion of
R&T (2003) that network competition does not imply, from a social standpoint, a better
or worse balance of fees between consumers and merchants. Chakravorti & Roson show
that, in general, the welfare gain of a drop in the total network fee more than compensates
the deterioration in the e¢ ciency of the fee balance. Moreover, network competition
unambiguously increases consumer and merchant surpluses.
Gans and King (2003) show that, under a general four-party model of a payment sys-
tem, abolishing the NSR is one su¢ cient condition to reach the neutrality of the IF, i.e.,
variations in the IF do not lead to changes in consumersdecisions on purchases, con-
sumersand merchantsadoption decisions and issuers, acquirersor merchantsprots.
However, Gans and King did not do a welfare analysis.
Wright (2003) undertakes the welfare analysis of the NSR under two-merchant compe-
tition extremes: monopoly and perfect competition. The author shows that (i) the NSR
is socially desirable when merchants operating in a monopoly EPN engage in price dis-
crimination based on payment instruments, and (ii) under Bertrand competition among
8See Chakravorti (2010) for an excellent review of the growing payment card literature and discussion
of the impact of regulatory interventions on card adoption, usage, and welfare.
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merchants, the social surplus does not change regardless the existence of the NSR. Wright
explains that if merchants are monopolists, the imposition of the NSR prevents them from
surcharging excessively. Therefore, the NSR increases social surplus. If merchants com-
pete à la Bertrand, they pass to consumers the full benets and costs associated with the
means of payment used to complete the transaction. Hence, under the NSR, competitive
merchants only accept cash or only accept card payments, and prices in the goods market
are equal to the respective marginal cost net of benets. Under surcharging, competitive
merchants accept both types of payment and price discriminate. However, Wright did
not consider competition among EPNs or intermediate cases of merchant market power.
Schwartz and Vincent (2006) investigates the NSR welfare distribution e¤ects among
cash users and card users when merchants are local monopolists. Although the authors
allow for elastic demand in the goods market, they assume that consumers are exogenously
divided between cash or card users. They conclude that the NSR harms cash users and
merchants and is protable to EPNs.
Our model di¤ers from the existing literature in several aspects. As far as we know, we
are the rst to introduce the NSR analysis in a two-sided market environment. Articles
studying the NSR have not considered network e¤ects in the analysis, while in our results
network e¤ects play an important role. Also, we do not assume a specic market structure
in the goods market. In fact, all market structures from perfect competition to monopoly
can be used in our model. While in past literature the price for goods is derived assuming
a given market structure, we assume that the price follows a reduced form that depends
on the degree of competition among merchants. This approach allows us to test explicitly
the impact of small market power changes in the goods market on the social desirability
of the NSR.
2 The Three-party Card Payment Model
Consider a model of payment card network competition with three agent types: pro-
prietary EPNs, consumers and merchants. There are three payment instruments: cash,
as the default payment instrument accessible to all consumers and merchants at no cost,
and two EPNs, EPN 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, cash payments are set to gen-
erate zero surplus both to payees and payors, whilst EPNs o¤er a service that may yield
positive benets for consumers and merchants. The elements of our model are as follows:
(i) Electronic Payment Networks, 1 and 2, are prot-maximizing and compete simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively in a two-sided market, charging membership fees f1 and
f2 to the cardholders and transaction fees m1 and m2, to merchants, respectively. Card
payments require the payee (merchant) and the payor (cardholder) to have a common
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payment platform.
(ii) Consumers choose at most one of the two possible EPNs. Those who decide
to make payments using an EPN are the cardholders, the remaining consumers pay all
transactions in cash. Each consumer makes one transaction with each existing merchant,
and therefore, the number of transactions in the economy is xed regardless of the payment
instruments used. Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences towards EPNs. For
example, AmEx and Discover may di¤er in terms of lines of credit or billing cycles, and
consumers have idiosyncratic preferences concerning those characteristics.
Consumer hs surplus of using EPN i = 1; 2 is private information (this prevents
merchants from price discriminating among consumers) and dened by
Uhi  Uhi (fi; pi; Dmi ) , (1)
where Dmi is the number of merchants on platform i, pi is the purchase price of a unit
good when payment is processed through EPN i, and fi is the membership fee paid by
consumers using platform i.
We assume that consumer surplus in (1) satises the following properties
(i)
@Uhi
@fi
< 0, (ii)
@Uhi
@pi
< 0, and (iii)
@Uhi
@Dmi
> 0. (2)
Properties (i) and (ii) in (2) imply that consumers prefer lower membership fees and lower
prices for goods. Intuitively, we can think of the unspent funds on goods and membership
fee as reverting to some other activity (where payment cards cannot be used) generating
surplus to cardholders. Property (iii) implies that cardholders prefer EPNs with larger
acceptance. When choosing a payment instrument, a consumer equates his idiosyncratic
surplus of using a card from EPN 1 against the surplus of using a card from EPN 2, and
checks whether the highest of the two is indeed positive; otherwise a consumer chooses
cash as his payment instrument and gets zero surplus.9
We assume that consumers know all prices before their card membership decisions and
that cardholders make all payments by card to the extent that this is feasible. In other
words, cardholders will only pay cash if the merchant does not accept payment through
the EPN to which the consumer subscribes. This may be due to liquidity constraints
or other properties coupled with card usage such as theft-insurance for goods purchased
with the card, or even dispute-resolution protection by EPNs.
9As an example of a functional form for Uhi take
Uhi = (h
c
i   (pi   p0))Dmi   fi
where p0 denotes the price of the good in a cash transaction, and hci is the idiosyncratic preference of
consumer h for EPN i. It satises all properties in (2) for hci > pi   p0.
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Each consumer buys one unit of the good per merchant. The price per unit of the good
is pi if the transaction is processed by EPN i, or p0 if it is a cash transaction. Regardless
of how the transaction is e¤ected, consumers are willing to pay v for the unit good.
Each cardholder subscribes to one EPN, that is, cardholders single-home,and pay
a xed (e.g., annual membership) fee, fi if they use EPN i, allowing them to make an un-
limited number of transactions at zero fee per transaction. The single-homing hypothesis
for cardholders is supported by Rysman (2007) that found empirical evidence in which,
although cardholders in U.S. may hold payment cards from more than one EPN, most of
them have a top of the wallet card, i.e., they prefer to use mainly one card. In our model,
this is equivalent to assuming that the benet of a second card is always lower than its
membership fee.10
(iii) Merchants can multi-home, i.e., besides cash, they have the option to accept
payments through both EPNs paying a per transaction charge according to the EPN em-
ployed on each transaction. We disregard possible steering strategies in which a merchant
might decide to refuse a network not because its net benet is negative but so as to induce
consumers to choose another payment network in which the merchant has a higher net
benet. Without loss of generality, the marginal cost of producing the goods demanded
by consumers is normalized to zero. Merchants bear the merchant fee as a supply cost
for cashless transactions, while not facing costs for cash transactions.
Merchants are heterogeneous in their gross surpluses b for cashless transactions. How-
ever, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the gross surplus b is independent of
the EPNs. Merchants surplus b from a cashless transaction may arise from cash-handling
costsreduction or from increased security. The additional surplus of a merchant, indexed
by b, who accepts electronic payments is given by,
Sb =
2X
i=1
max f(pi   p0 + b mi)Dci ; 0g , (3)
where Dci denotes the number of cardholders on platform i. Note that a merchant will
accept to run transactions under an EPN as long pi   p0 + b mi  0.
(iv) Under surcharge, the equilibrium price in the goods market, pi, is given by a
weighted average11 of the net cost of selling the good, mi  b, and consumers willingness-
to-pay, v. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of producing the good is zero
and, mi   b is the merchant cost net of benet b of accepting the payment via EPN i.
Mathematically we have pi = v+ (1  ) (mi   b). The price of the same transaction in
cash is p0 = v. Lemma 1 highlights the appropriateness of this simplication that will
10The additional benet of an EPN j card for an EPN i cardholder is based only on the number of
merchants that accept EPN j and do not accept EPN i.
11The weight  measures merchantsmarket power toward consumers in the goods market.
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be particularly relevant in the welfare analysis (section 5). When surcharging is allowed,
prices in the goods market may di¤er according to the EPN employed to complete the
payment, i.e., p1 may di¤er from p2.
We use a set of general assumptions regarding the end-users demands (assumption 1
on consumers and assumption 2 on merchants below) and the equilibrium price in the
goods market (reduced form solution in Lemma 1 below). The detailed description of the
di¤erent agents and price determination in the goods market follows.
Consumers. Formally, consumers, (superscript c hereafter) demand function for EPN
is services arises from the mass of consumers satisfying the following two inequalities:
Uhi  Uhj and Uhi  0. Let consumers demand be represented by
Dci  Dci
 
fi   fj; S (pi   pj) ; Dmi   Dmj

, i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, (4)
where S is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if surcharge is allowed or 0 under the NSR
and, 0 <  < 1 measures to what extent EPNs 1, 2 are substitute payment instruments
from the consumersstandpoint. Equation (4) satises assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1 (Consumers demand): Consumers demand for EPN is services in (4) is
a twice di¤erentiable function decreasing in Nfi and Npi, and increasing in NDmi , where
Nfi  fi   fj,
Npi  S (pi   pj) ,
NDmi  Dmi   Dmj .
Intuitively, assumption 1 means that when choosing an EPN, consumers compare
the fee and price of purchasing goods using EPN i, fi and pi, against similar values of
purchasing using EPN j, fj and pj.12 According to (i) and (ii) in (2) consumers demand
for EPN i should decrease in Nfi and Npi since Uhi  Uhj is harder to satisfy. For any
xed (fj; pj), Uhi  0 is harder to satisfy as fi or pi increase. If  increases, the degree of
substitution between EPNs from the consumersperspective will be higher (see Singh and
Vives (1984)). Similar rationale applies to the goods price when S = 1, and to merchant
acceptance coverage variations.
Cardholders take into account the cross-group externality captured by NDmi , that is,
they care about the extent of merchant acceptance o¤ered by each network. The larger
the merchant acceptance by EPN i relatively to network j, the larger will be the demand
12Under the NSR, Npi = 0, consumers only equate membership fees and the number of merchants
accepting each EPN in their payment instrument decisions.
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for payment services of network i, ceteris paribus, since Uhi  Uhj and Uhi  0 are then
easier to satisfy given the denition of consumers utility in (1).13
The goods market equilibrium. For simplicity we treat the equilibrium prices in the
goods market as a reduced form solution (p0; p

1; p

2). When surcharging is allowed, the
prices are given by
p0 = v, (5)
p1 = v + (1  ) (m1   b) , (6)
p2 = v + (1  ) (m2   b) , (7)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes merchant market power in the goods market.14 When the NSR is
imposed, the goods market price is the same regardless of the payment instrument chosen
by the consumer, i.e., pNSR0 = p
NSR
i = p

0 + (1  ) pi = v+ (1  ) (1  ) (mi   b) in
the symmetric equilibrium,  2 [0; 1].15
The assumed reduced form solutions (5) to (7) are general in the sense that they can
mimic, with an appropriate , the price equilibria of standard Micro and IO models of rm
competition. For example, if  = 0, then (p0; p

1; p

2) = (0;m1   b;m2   b), corresponding
to the perfectly competitive market outcome in which prices equal the net marginal costs.
If  = 1, then (p0; p

1; p

2) = (v; v; v)merchants have maximummarket power and set prices
equal to consumers maximum willingness-to-pay. In the case of duopolistic competition
à la Hotelling, prices correspond to the sum of the net marginal cost, mi   b, plus a
transportation cost t. The analog to our reduced form pricing can be re-written as pi =
 (v   (mi   b)) +mi   b,  set equal to  = tv (mi b) . In the Cournot oligopoly with N
rms, constant marginal costs mi   b, and linear demand P = v   bQ, the equilibrium
price is P  = 1
N+1
v + N
N+1
(mi   b), which corresponds to setting  = 1N+1 in the reduced
form solution. Lemma 1 generalizes the application of the reduced form solution in the
goods market equilibrium.
13If both EPNs increase their membership fees by one dollar, the total impact in the number of
cardholders in the economy will be negative. From the denition in (4),
@Dci
@fi
+
@Dci
@fj
+
@Dcj
@fi
+
@Dcj
@fj
=

@Dci
@fi
+
@Dcj
@fj

(1  ) = 2 (1  ) @D
c
i
@fi
< 0,
since @Dci =@fi < 0 by assumption 1 and 0 <  < 1.
14This is equivalent to saying that p1 and p

2 are bounded, p

i 2 [mi   b; v], i = 1; 2. We assume that
merchants do not face costs for setting multiple prices for the same product, i.e., there is no cost of
surcharging.
15We assume that under the NSR the equilibrium price falls between p0 and p

i . This reects either
the NSR, or even when merchants are allowed to surcharge, that they choose to not do so. Empirically
we nd that merchants do not usually set di¤erential prices depending on the payment mean. Frankel
(1998) calls this phenomenon price coherence.
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Lemma 1 (Goods Market Reduced Form Solution): Consider market k characterized
by (i) constant net marginal cost k of providing the good, (ii) consumer willingness-to-
pay v, and (iii) v > k. For any level of competition among rms in the market there
exists a unique  2 [0; 1] such that the equilibrium price pk can be written as pk () =
v + (1  ) k.
Proof : All proofs are in an appendix.
Merchants. Given the merchant fees (m1;m2) and goods market prices (p0; p1; p2), mer-
chants choose whether to request access either to EPN 1 or 2, multi-home by accepting
both EPNs or accept cash only. Formally, merchants (superscript m hereafter) demand
function for EPN i services corresponds to the mass of merchants that satises the non-
negativity of the rst argument in (3), i.e., pi   p0 + b  mi  0 , b  mi   (pi   p0).
Thus, merchantsdemand is
Dmi (mi)  Pr (b  mi   (pi   p0)) , i = 1; 2 (8)
where b follows a distribution with support

0;b

. Equation (8) satises assumption 2
below.
Assumption 2 (Merchants demand): Merchants demand for EPN is services is a twice
di¤erentiable function such that Dmi (mi)
0 < 0.
Remark 1 (Merchants Demand): Merchants demand is dened by (8). Under the NSR,
pNSR1 = p
NSR
2 = p
NSR
0 , condition (8) becomes Pr (b  mi jNSR). Under surcharging pi  
p0 = (1  ) (mi   b). Therefore, Pr (b  mi   (pi   p0)) = Pr (b  mi   (1  ) (mi   b)) =
Pr (b  mi ), which is identical to the condition that denes merchants demand under the
NSR. Hence, the merchants demand functional form is the same regardless of whether
the NSR is imposed or not. Murphy and Ott (1977) suggest that cash customers impose
more costs than card users on merchantsprots. In fact, currently there are businesses
that are no longer accepting cash.16 Our model follows this suggestion by normalizing to
zero the merchant cost of a cash transaction and dening mi   b  0 as the cost of doing
the same transaction electronically. 
Despite the fact that merchant demand functions are independent of the number of
cardholders in each network, we still have cross-group network e¤ects because the surplus
of a merchant depends on the number of cardholders as dened in (3). In this aspect,
our approach is similar to R&T (2003), where the total surplus of a merchant accepting
EPN i, with gross per transaction surplus b is (b mi)Dci depends on the number of
cardholders Dci .
17
16New York Restaurant Loses Its Appetite for Cash, The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2009;
Plastic only: Cafe refuses to accept cash, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, October 11, 2006.
17However, R&T (2003) assumed that the No-Surcharge Rule is always imposed.
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Platforms. EPN i chooses simultaneously and non-cooperatively the end-user fees, fi
per cardholder and mi per transaction. Without loss of generality, assume that platforms
have costs normalized to zero or alternatively interpret fi andmi as price-to-cost margins.
Each merchant completes one transaction with each one of the cardholders, resulting in a
total number of transactions processed by EPN i of Dmi D
c
i . Platform i solves the following
maximization problem.
max
fi;mi
i = fiD
c
i +miD
m
i D
c
i , i = 1; 2 and i 6= j (9)
subject to
Dci = D
c
i
 
fi   fj; S (pi (mi)  pj (mj)) ; Dmi   Dmj

from (4)
Dmi = D
m
i (mi) from (8)
A summary of the models notation is shown in table 1.
Table 1 - Notation Summary
pi price of a unit of a good with payment processed under EPN i
p0 price of a unit of a good when cash is used for payment
fi cardholder membership (annual) fee at EPN i
mi merchant fee per transaction processed under EPN i
Dci number of cardholders on EPN i
Dmi number (mass) of merchants on EPN i
S indicator variable taking value 1 if surcharge is allowed, 0 otherwise
v consumers willingness-to-pay for a unit of a good
 substitution degree among EPNs
b merchant benet of a cashless transaction relatively to cash
b highest value of b
 merchant market power in the goods market
3 The Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium concept used is the Nash equilibrium dened below, where
(f ;m)  (f1; f2;m1;m2).
Denition (Market Equilibrium): A market equilibrium is a pair of pairs (f i ;m

i ), i =
1; 2, such that 8i, (f i ;mi ) solves max
fi;mi
i, dened in (9), subject to end-user demands
(Dci (f ;m) ; D
m
i (mi)), (4) and (8), taking as given the fee choices (fj;mj)j 6=i of EPN j.
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A main goal of the paper is to understand the impact of the NSR on platforms com-
petition, pricing structure, and prots. The roadmap for this section is as follows. First
we derive a series of results with elasticities characterizing the platforms optimal pricing
conditions. Then, we verify the NSRs impact on those elasticities. Our results show
that (i) the EPNsprot maximization problem consists of two parts: setting the average
total fee level per transaction, and setting the relative fees, (ii) under the NSR, consumers
demand for EPNs becomes less elastic with respect to merchant fees, and (iii) under the
NSR, the total fee is higher.
Second, once the optimal fee mechanism for networks is disassembled, we derive the
market equilibrium pricing and prots. We compare market equilibrium fees and prots
under surcharging versus under the NSR. We show that the NSR (i) rebalances the pricing
structure in favor of cardholders, and (ii) increases platformsprots if and only if the
network externality exerted by merchants over cardholders is su¢ ciently weak.
3.1 The Elasticity Rule
3.1.1 The platformsoptimal private solution
Lemma 2 shows the rule that prot maximizing platforms follow when choosing the
pricing structure.
Lemma 2 (PlatformsOptimal Private Solution): Prot maximizing platforms set fees
according to the following rule,
si +mi =
si
"c
=
mi
"m + "c;m
(10)
where
si  fi
Dmi
, "c   dD
c
i
dsi
si
Dci
, "c;m   dD
c
i
dmi
mi
Dci
, "m   dD
m
i
dmi
mi
Dmi
.
This result is reminiscent of a nding by R&T (2003), in the sense that it shows that
the networks maximization problem of choosing the optimal fees can be decomposed in
two parts: (i) setting the (average) total fee level si +mi and (ii) setting the relative fees
ratio si=mi,
si
"c
=
mi
"m + "c;m
, si
mi
=
"c
"m + "c;m
. (11)
The novelty on this result is the introduction of the e¤ect of a variation in network
size. The term "c;m in the EPN optimal pricing rule arises because the cardholders are
sensitive to the number of merchants in each EPN and to their fees, as these are reected
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in the nal goods prices. In R&T (2003) such interaction does not exist and therefore
"c;m = 0.
3.1.2 Elasticity decomposition and the NSR impact
The introduction of the cross elasticity term "c;m measures consumers demand varia-
tion with respect to changes in merchant fees. Therefore, the cross elasticity term plays
an important role since it captures, among other e¤ects, how consumers change their
demand for network services in the presence of the NSR. To investigate the NSR impact
on consumersdemand, it is convenient to decompose the cross elasticity "c;m in order
to separate the NSR (pricing) e¤ect from the remaining e¤ects. Lemma 3 presents this
decomposition.
Lemma 3 (Elasticity decomposition): The prot-maximizing rule (10) can be re-written
as
si +mi =
si
"c
=
mi
"m (1 + "Dc;Dm) + "Dc;Np"Np;m
,
with the following notation,
"m   dD
m
i
dmi
mi
Dmi
, "D
c;Npi    @D
c
i
@ (Npi)
Npi
Dci
, "Np;m  @Npi
@mi
mi
Npi
, "D
c;Dm  @D
c
i
@Dmi
Dmi
Dci
.
We can show that
"c;m = "D
c;Np"Np;m + "D
c;Dm"m, (12)
where "y;x refers to the percentage impact on y of 1% change in variable x. From (12)
we observe that the impact of merchant fees on cardholders demand for EPNs can be
decomposed in two e¤ects.
(i) The goods market price e¤ect, "D
c;Np"Np;m, due to merchant fee di¤erences that
enhance goods market price di¤erences when EPN-based prices are allowed. Note that the
NSR inuences the cross elasticity "c;m through the goods market price e¤ect. Specically,
when the NSR is binding, from the consumersstandpoint the goods market price does
not vary irrespective of the EPN chosen to process payments. In our model, the NSR is
equivalent to imposing S = 0 =) Npi = 0 which by its turn implies "Dc;Np"Np;m = 0.18
(ii) The cross-group externality e¤ect, "D
c;Dm"m, is due to the assumption that card-
holders prefer EPNs with larger merchant acceptance. Since the number of merchants
18Under the NSR, the goods market price e¤ect is
"D
c;Np"Np;m =   @D
c
i
@ (Npi)
mi
Dci
:
@ (Npi)
@mi
= 0,
since @ (Npi) =@mi = 0 due to the fact that Npi = 0 as a result of the NSR.
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in each EPN is inuenced by merchant fees, cardholders behavior will also be indirectly
inuenced by those fees.
Given the elasticity decomposition shown in Lemma 3, the following result regarding
the NSR arises.
Proposition 1 (No-Surcharge Rule impact): Relatively to the market equilibrium without
restrictions, under the NSR regime, entailing Npi = 0, (i) the cross elasticity of consumers
demand to merchant fees becomes less elastic and, (ii) EPNs increase the average total
fee level per transaction.
3.2 Pricing Structure and Prots at the Market Equilibrium
This section presents and compares the market equilibrium pricing structure and prof-
its under surcharging and under the NSR. We show rst that the NSR biases the pricing
structure in favor of cardholders. Second, we show that the NSR will increase platforms
prots if and only if the network externality exerted by merchants over cardholders is
su¢ ciently weak.
3.2.1 Market equilibrium under surcharging
The optimal conditions from prot maximization in (9) are8<:
@i
@fi
= Dci + fi
@Dci
@fi
+mi

@Dmi
@fi
Dci +
@Dci
@fi
Dmi

= 0
@i
@mi
= fi
dDci
dmi
+

Dmi D
c
i +mi

dDmi
dmi
Dci +D
m
i
dDci
dmi

= 0,
where @Dmi =@fi = 0 since D
m
i in (8) does not depend on cardholder fees fi, and
dDci
dmi
 @D
c
i
@mi
+
@Dci
@ (Npi)
@Npi
@mi
,
as a matter of terminology simplication.
The optimality conditions can be re-written as8>>><>>>:
fi =
Dci+mi
@Dci
@fi
Dmi
  @D
c
i
@fi
mi =  
fi
dDci
dmi
+Dmi D
c
i
dDm
i
dmi
Dci+D
m
i
dDc
i
dmi
.
(13)
To guarantee that the pricing solution from system (13) is indeed a maximizer of
platforms prot we introduce assumption 3.
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Assumption 3 (Demand functions linearity): Functions Dci () and Dmi (mi) are linear
in all the respective arguments.
Assumption 3 implies that Dci () and Dmi (mi) second-order partial derivatives are
zero. In the appendix, we show that assumption 3 is su¢ cient to guarantee that the
system (13) denes a prot maximizing solution for EPN i. Graphically, the system is
represented by two downward-sloping curves intersecting at the equilibrium point.19
Figure 2: Illustration of optimal pricing conditions and the equilibrium point.
Solving the system of simultaneous equations (13) for (fi;mi) we have:
Proposition 2 (Market Equilibrium under surcharging): The market equilibrium with
surcharging is characterized by (i) merchant per transaction fees mi =
dDci
dmi
  @D
c
i
@fi
Dmi
dDm
i
dmi
@Dc
i
@fi
, (ii)
cardholder membership fees f i =  
dDmi
dmi
Dci+D
m
i

dDci
dmi
  @D
c
i
@fi
Dmi

@Dc
i
@fi
dDm
i
dmi
, and (iii) platforms prot
i =
(Dci )
2
  @D
c
i
@fi
, for i = 1; 2.
3.2.2 Market equilibrium under the NSR
Under the NSR, the goods market is ruled by a single price irrespective the EPN used
to complete transactions. The following Proposition shows that the NSR rebalances the
pricing structure in favor of the cardholders and to the detriment of merchants.
Proposition 3 (Changes in pricing structure under the NSR): Relatively to the market
equilibrium with surcharging, the EPN pricing structure under the NSR decreases card-
holder membership fees and increases merchant per transaction charges.
We have seen from Proposition 1 that under the NSR consumersdemand for EPNs
is less elastic to variations of merchant fees. This is because under the NSR merchant
19This can be shown by applying the implicit function theorem to the FOCs that dene the equilibrium.
16
fee di¤erences cannot be reected in purchase price di¤erences. Since, under the NSR,
consumers are less responsive to merchant fees, EPNs charge higher fees to merchants.
However, higher merchant fees will cause the mass of merchants accepting electronic
payments to decline. This in turn reduces cardholder valuation of the EPN. Thus, in
accordance with the EPNs best-response function, membership fees should be lower,
otherwise the EPNs would lose cardholders and prots would decline.
We now study the NSR protability, that is, the conditions under which the NSR
results in an increase of EPNsprots. Proposition 4 below shows that the NSR will be a
protable strategy for networks if and only if the externality that merchants exert over
cardholders, @D
c
i
@mi
=
@Dci
@(NDmi )
dDmi
dmi
, is weak enough.20
The intuition for the result is as follows. Suppose that merchants exert a large positive
externality, that is, consumers are willing to pay a much higher membership fee if EPN
i has a larger merchant acceptance. Hence, if EPNs implement the NSR, by Proposition
3, merchant per transaction charges will increase, and by Assumption 2 the number of
merchants on the network will decrease. But then cardholders demand will su¤er a sharp
cutback that could only be compensated by a su¢ ciently large discount on the membership
fee. However, such a large discount would be unprotable for EPNs.
Also note that if consumers demand strongly varies with fi, that is, if consumers are
strongly responsive to membership fees, then the NSR will be a protable strategy since,
by Proposition 3, it induces a membership fee reduction and thus invigorates cardholder
demand. Proposition 4 presents the formal condition that assures protability of the
NSR for an EPN. As corollary, if the protability condition holds for one rm, then,
under symmetry, it will hold for both.
Proposition 4 (The NSR protability): The NSR is a protable strategy for an EPN
if and only if network externalities exerted by merchants over cardholders are su¢ ciently
weak, i.e., i¤
@Dci@mi  < @Dci@fi Dmi .
Corollary to Proposition 4: Under symmetry of end-user demands, if the NSR is a
protable strategy for an EPN, then it will be a dominant strategy for both EPNs.
For the rest of the exposition, we assume that if the NSR is implemented by an EPN
it is protable, and condition @Dci=@mi > D
m
i :@D
c
i=@fi in Proposition 4 holds.
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we rst check the NSR impact on the number of end-users in the
electronic payment system and on the goods market price. We show that the NSR reduces
20Note that @Dci =@mi measures cardholder demand variation to merchant fee. Therefore, the larger
the derivative (in absolute value), the larger will be the cross-group externality that merchants exert.
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the number of merchants accepting card payments, increases the number of cardholders,
and raises the equilibrium goods market price paid by cardholders.
We then investigate the surplus variations that the NSR implies on each group of
agents. We also discuss the total welfare variation and show conditions under which soci-
ety is better o¤under the NSR equilibrium. We highlight that (i) merchant market power,
, in the goods market and (ii) the network externality from merchants to cardholders
are two relevant determinants of whether the NSR is socially desirable.
According to Proposition 3, merchants per transaction charges are higher under the
NSR. Therefore, by assumption 2, the number of merchants accepting payment cards
will unambiguously decrease. Regarding cardholders, the analysis is more complex in the
sense that we nd two opposite e¤ects on cardholders demand: the decrease on cardholder
fee and the increase on merchant fees that diminishes the number of merchants accepting
cards. However, assuming that the network e¤ects exerted by merchants over cardholders
are su¢ ciently weak (condition from Proposition 4), the former e¤ect dominates the latter
and the NSR net e¤ect on cardholders demand will be positive.
The e¤ect on the goods market price paid by cardholders is straightforward by Lemma
1. Since merchants per transaction charges are part of their marginal cost, the equilibrium
price paid by cardholders increases. Proposition 5 formalizes these intuitions.21
Proposition 5 (NSR impact on the number of end-users and goods market price): Rela-
tively to the surcharging case, the NSR leads to (i) a reduction on the number of merchants
accepting card payments, (ii) an increase on the number of cardholdersand (iii) an in-
crease on the equilibrium goods market price paid by cardholders.
Remark 2. Despite the fact that cardholder fees are lower under the NSR, cardholders
face additional expenditure related with the price adjustment in the goods market due
to the merchant fees increase. Note that, as merchants market power increases, the price
increase in the goods market, due to the NSR, is smaller. In the limit, if the goods
market has a monopolistic structure  = 1, then pi = 0. When merchant market power
in the goods market is high, prices follow closely consumer willingness-to-pay. In other
words, merchants do not pass-through the marginal cost of card usage to cardholders. If
merchant market power is high ( ' 1) and the NSR is introduced, then cardholders will
keep paying (approximately) the same price in the goods market but membership fees
will be lower. Proposition 6 below shows the merchantsmarket power relevance for the
goods market as one determinant of the NSR social desirability. 
We discuss the variations on merchant and cardholder payment surpluses due to the
21The e¤ect of the NSR on the number of transactions on platform i, Dmi D
c
i , is unclear. As we have
seen from Proposition 5 the number of merchants decreases but there is an increase on the number of
cardholders. Therefore, is not clear which will be the dominant e¤ect.
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NSR implementation. Merchant surplus on EPN i is dened as
Surplusmi 
0B@ bZ
mi
Dmi (xi) dxi
1CADci ,
where b corresponds to merchant highest willingness-to-pay per cashless transaction, de-
ned by Dmi
 
b

= 0; i = 1; 2;
bR
mi
Dmi (xi) dxi is the merchant surplus per transaction and
Dci is the number of transactions that each merchant will process through EPN i.
For the sake of simplicity, cardholderstotal surplus on network i is denoted by
V ci  V ci (fi; pi (mi) ; Dmi ) ,
satisfying similar properties as in (2) for an individual cardholder.
@V ci
@fi
< 0,
@V ci
@pi
< 0 and
@V ci
@Dmi
> 0.
We highlight that cardholder surplus decreases with expenditure fi and pi (mi), since
marginal cardholders will stop using the EPN when total expenditure increases and those
who remain at the EPN will see their individual surplus to decrease. Additionally, the
derivative with respect to the number of merchants captures two e¤ects: the change on the
number of transactions under EPN i and, the impact on cardholders willingness-to-pay
for is payment card.
Lemma 4.1 summarizes the value functions variations, introduced by the NSR, on
both agent types. Lemma 4.2 shows the expression for social surplus variation.
Lemma 4.1 (Variations of EPNsprot and end-userstotal surpluses): Let
V mi 
miZ
mi
Dmi (xi) dxi and
V ci  V ci (fi; pi (mi) ; Dmi ) denote cardholderstotal surplus at EPN i,
then the approximated variation, due to the NSR,
(i) on EPN is prot is (1  ) 2Dci

@Dci
@mi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi
 @Dci
@mi
  dD
c
i
dmi
 

@Dc
i
@fi
2
dDm
i
dmi
,
(ii) on merchants total surplus is
2X
i=1
h
V mi

@Dci
@mi
 Dmi @D
c
i
@fi

 Dmi (mi)Dci
i @Dci
@mi
  dD
c
i
dmi
@Dc
i
@fi
dDm
i
dmi
,
and
(iii) on cardholderstotal surplus is
2X
i=1
"
@V ci
@pi
(1 )
dDm
i
dmi
  @V ci
@fi
Dmi
dDm
i
dmi
+
@V ci
@Dmi
#
@Dci
@mi
  dD
c
i
dmi
@Dc
i
@fi
.
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Note that EPNs prot variation is positive i¤ @D
c
i
@mi
>
@Dci
@fi
Dmi as derived and inter-
preted in Proposition 4. Regarding merchants, since @D
c
i
@fi
dDmi
dmi
> 0 and @D
c
i
@mi
  dDci
dmi
> 0, the
sign of their surplus variation depends positively on
sign

V mi

@Dci
@mi
 Dmi
@Dci
@fi

 Dmi Dci

= sign

@Dci
@mi
 Dmi
@Dci
@fi
  D
m
i D
c
i
V mi

which is undetermined without further assumptions.
Given @Dci=@fi < 0 by assumption 1, the sign of the cardholder surplus variation
depends negatively on
sign
(
@V ci
@pi
(1  )
dDmi
dmi
  @V
c
i
@fi
Dmi
dDmi
dmi
+
@V ci
@Dmi
)
. (14)
The previous expression depends on the merchant market power . Hence, if  is
su¢ ciently high such that (14) is negative, consumers will benet from the NSR.22 The
reason why cardholder surplus variation (due to the NSR) depends positively on merchant
market power is similar to that of Remark 2.
Finally, social surplus variation is as follows.23
Lemma 4.2 (Total Welfare Variation): The social welfare variation due to the NSR is
approximately given by
W 
2X
i=1
24 @V ci@pi (1  )  @V ci@fi Dmi + @V ci@Dmi dDmidmi  DciDmi  @Dci@fi +
+

V mi
@Dci
@fi
  2 (1  )Dci

@Dci
@mi
 Dmi @D
c
i
@fi
 35 @Dci@mi   dDcidmi
@Dci
@fi
2
dDmi
dmi
.
Since
@Dci
@mi
  dDci
dmi
@Dci
@fi
2
dDmi
dmi
< 0,
the relevant term that determines the social welfare variation is,
22If
@V ci
@Dmi
dDmi
dmi
>
@V ci
@fi
Dmi ,
hence, for  = 1, expression in (14) is negative.
23Recall that, by assumption, cash payments do not generate value to both payee and payor. Thus,
cash payments are discarded from the welfare analysis.
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
@V ci
@pi
(1  )  @V
c
i
@fi
Dmi +
@V ci
@Dmi
dDmi
dmi
 DciDmi

@Dci
@fi
+
+

V mi
@Dci
@fi
  2 (1  )Dci

@Dci
@mi
 Dmi
@Dci
@fi

,
in which
V mi
@Dci
@fi
  2 (1  )Dci

@Dci
@mi
  @D
c
i
@fi
Dmi

< 0 holding the condition from Proposition 4.
The term with undetermined sign is
@V ci
@pi
(1  )  @V
c
i
@fi
Dmi +
@V ci
@Dmi
dDmi
dmi
 DciDmi ,
depending on merchants market power in the goods market. Proposition 6 shows under
what conditions the NSR is socially (un)desirable.
Proposition 6 (The NSR impact on total welfare): The NSR will be socially (un)desirable
if the network externality exerted by merchants on cardholders is su¢ ciently weak (strong)
and merchants market power in the goods market is su¢ ciently high (low), i.e., if
@Dci@mi
 < (>) @Dci@fi
Dmi and  > (<) 1  DciDmi   @V
c
i
@Dmi
dDmi
dmi
+
@V ci
@fi
Dmi
@V ci
@pi
.
Proposition 6s main message is that the network externality condition that assures
the NSR protability to EPNs may be insu¢ cient to guarantee a better social outcome. In
order to assure social desirability, the NSR has to be applied in markets whose merchants
have su¢ ciently high market power, i.e., dene prices according to consumers willingness-
to-pay and do not fully pass-through the marginal cost of sales (including the card usage)
to cardholders (recall Remark 2). Hence, under the NSR, in a market whose merchants
have su¢ ciently high market power, cardholders do not pay much more for their purchases
while benet from a discount on the membership fee. In these cases, the NSR acts as a
pricing distortion (see Proposition 3) that partially corrects the opposite price distortion
in the goods market due to merchants market power. Recalling the expression ght re
with re, a way to combat a distortion is with another distortion.
On the other hand, if the market for goods is highly competitive, i.e., market price
is close to cost, then the NSR will implicitly generate distortions by inating merchant
costs when serving cardholders. In that case, the NSR will introduce a distortion in a
market which had no distortions, making society worse o¤.
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Therefore, although merchant market power is irrelevant to EPNs when deciding on
the implementation of the NSR, it is fundamental in determining the NSR desirability
from the social perspective. In fact, the higher the merchant market power , the bigger
the likelihood of the NSR being socially desirable.24
The network e¤ect exerted by merchants on cardholders also a¤ects total surplus. If
the network e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then the NSR will reduce cardholder surplus due
to the decrease in the number of merchants accepting card payments. Hence, the social
perspective suggests the existence of a relationship between merchants market power
 and network e¤ect exerted by merchants on cardholders, @Dci=@mi. Proposition 7
presents the social indi¤erence equation which is the set of allocations with coordinates
(;NE) 2 [0; 1]  R+0 where society is indi¤erent to whether the NSR is implemented.
Let NE denote the network e¤ect that the number of merchants accepting card payments
has on cardholders demand, i.e.,  @Dci=@mi.
Proposition 7 (The Social Indi¤erence Equation): The set of allocations with coordinates
(;NE) 2 [0; 1]  R+0 such that society is indi¤erent to the NSR implementation, i.e.,
W = 0, is characterized by
NE =
 
@V ci
@pi
(1  )  @V ci
@fi
Dmi +
+
@V ci
@Dmi
dDmi
dmi
 DciDmi
! @Dci
@fi
V mi
@Dci
@fi
  2 (1  )Dci
 Dmi
@Dci
@fi
,
where NE   @Dci=@mi.
Proposition 7 highlights the existence of a relationship between the network externality
that merchants exert on cardholders and merchant market power in the goods market.
Under the NSR, @ (NE) =@ = @V
c
i
@pi
@Dci
@fi
.
2 (1  )Dci   V mi @D
c
i
@fi

> 0, hence even if the
NE is signicant it might be the case that the NSR is socially desirable when the merchant
market power is su¢ ciently high.
From Proposition 4, we can write the EPN is indi¤erence equation between imple-
menting the NSR or not as
@Dci
@mi
  @D
c
i
@fi
Dmi = 0, NE =  
@Dci
@fi
Dmi .
Therefore, at the point of indi¤erence, an increase of NE (cross-group Network E¤ects)
will make the NSR an unprotable strategy.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the set of points where the NSR is a protable strategy for
EPN i (areas A and B) and compares it to the set of points where the NSR is socially
desirable (areas B and C).
24By introducing a cost of surcharging the merchant market power threshold, from which the NSR is
socially desirable, should decrease.
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Figure 3: Illustration of social and EPNs indi¤erence lines.
The NSR is a protable strategy as long as the network e¤ect from merchants on
cardholders is below the threshold EPN indi¤erence line, regardless of . However, from
the social perspective, for low levels of , even ifNE is below the EPNs indi¤erence curve,
the NSR might not increase social welfare (the area A). In area A there is a misalignment
of social and network interests. On the one hand, the NSR increases networksprots,
but, on the other, its social cost (price distortions due to the increase on merchant fee)
reduces the social benet (namely, lower cardholder membership fee).
As we redo the cost-benet analysis for higher levels of merchant market power in the
goods market, i.e., higher  (keeping the NE xed at some positive level and below the
EPN indi¤erence curve) the social benet from the NSR increases since it contributes to
correct market power distortions. We get then into area B where both network and social
interests are aligned in favor of the NSR implementation.
Area C corresponds to the situation when the NSR social benet, amending the high
merchant market power, is su¢ ciently high that compensates the social cost, under strong
network externalities (i.e., above the EPN indi¤erence line). Area C is characterized by
the divergence of network and social interests. Hence, in the absence of regulation or
transfers, despite the fact that the NSR is socially desirable, EPNs will choose not to
implement it. Although area C may not exist,25 area B where network and social interests
are aligned on NSR implementation will necessarily exist (see the proof of Proposition 8).
25See gure 4 for an illustration where area C does not exist.
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Figure 4: Illustration of social indi¤erence line below the EPNs indi¤erence line, for all
 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 8 shows that area B always exists. In other words, there exists a set of
allocations where the NSR is socially desirable and simultaneously protable for EPNs.
Proposition 8 (Existence of allocations where the NSR is socially desirable and prof-
itable): For @V ci =@fi su¢ ciently negative, there exists a set of allocations with coordinates
(;NE) 2 [0; 1]R+0 such that the NSR is simultaneously socially desirable and protable
for EPNs.
In the following section we discuss possible policy interventions taking into consider-
ation the results previously derived.
5 Policy Interventions: one size does not t all
In this section, we discuss policy considerations and possible interventions in the pay-
ment card industry with regard to the NSR. We start by considering the pros and cons
of abolishing the NSR versus no regulatory intervention, i.e., letting EPNs decide on the
NSR implementation. We conclude that one policy does not t all markets. In general,
there are signicant di¤erences from market to market. We claim that regulators should
take into account those market specicities, namely the merchants market power, deciding
about the NSR on a market-by-market basis instead of uniformly regulating all markets.
5.1 Eliminating restrictions on di¤erential pricing
During the last decade courts and policymakers have investigated the business prac-
tices of payment networks. In most countries, card networks impose the NSR preventing
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merchants from setting di¤erent prices across EPNs. However, abolishing restrictions on
di¤erential pricing may be an attractive policy option for society as a whole. For example,
the Reserve Bank of Australia has decided to remove the NSR.
Some authors claim that abolishing the NSR would remove a restraint of trade.
Nonetheless, this economic justication is questionable. For instance, according to our
analysis (see footnote 20) it is unclear that the number of card transactions will increase
or decrease without the NSR. Proposition 5 shows that without the NSR on the one
hand the number of merchants accepting card payments will increase, but on the other
hand fewer consumers will use payment cards. Hence, the net e¤ect on the number of
transactions is not clear a priori.
Here, we highlight some of the pros and cons of this policy. The NSR exclusion has the
advantage of being a transparent policy, easy to implement and enforce; it does not require
the regulator to have information about costs and benets of any of the agents involved in
a transaction. Its applicability and e¤ect does not depend on the card type (debit, prepaid
or credit), the network organizational structure (three-party or four-party systems), or
its pricing strategy. Moreover, it may allow for goods market price changes so to reect
the real costs and benets of card transactions to merchants. Hence, consumers may
internalize the externalities tied to the use of payment cards, which would promote more
e¢ cient payment card use from the social perspective. However, this argument is valid
only as long as merchantsbehavior is su¢ ciently competitive (see Remark 2). In order
for di¤erential pricing to correctly internalize externalities, these price di¤erences must
accurately reect social costs and benets. If merchants have market power, they might
obstruct the NSR suppression policy from encouraging the e¢ cient utilization of card
payments by distorting prices and fees away from the social costs and benets. Another
disadvantage of this policy is that it may generate confusion and uncertainty among
consumers, if merchants set a di¤erent price for each payment means. Also, merchants
would bear extra costs of setting and managing a system with several prices for each
product. In particular, we should expect increased (menu) costs to merchants of updating
price lists, pamphlets, and shelf prices.
5.2 Laissez faire, laissez aller, laissez passer
An alternative policy for antitrust authorities regarding the payment card system is
simply not to intervene. We discuss here some pros and cons of the laissez faire policy.
First, it is not clear ex-ante that the market outcome is less e¢ cient than what would
result with intervention. For example, in Proposition 8 we show that there exists a set
of allocations (area B) where EPNs choices regarding the NSR adoption are compatible
with the socially desirable choices. Nonetheless, while it is ambiguous that the market
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outcome is ine¢ cient, it is also unclear that it is e¢ cient. For example, consider area A in
Figure 3. In that set, the NSR implementation is optimal from the network perspective
but undesirable from the social standpoint.
Second, policy interventions may generate unforeseen and unintended adverse conse-
quences for the payment card system. However, private or government legal actions based
on antitrust laws are important to provide e¤ective means to deal with competition is-
sues on the payment card industry. Furthermore, litigation implies substantial costs and
without regulation it would signicantly increase uncertainty with regard to the outcome
of possible negotiations or of a verdict in court. Regulatory indecision may also delay the
introduction of innovation in the electronic payment system.
Third, entry and innovation have occurred in the payment industry (e.g. PayPal)
reecting the free market performance to tackle merchant concerns about high merchant
fees for payment card transactions. However, because of network e¤ects and consumer
inertia, the establishment of new payment networks is hard. Hence, the extent to which
these entrants will serve as e¤ective competitors for the established networks is unclear,
particularly when faced with well-established incumbent networks.
5.3 One size does not t all
Di¤erent policy choices have been made by policymakers regarding the payment card
industry over the last two decades. For example, in Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom, the NSR has been abolished, while in many countries the NSR
still prevail. In the U.S. this rule has been abolished by MasterCard and Visa but not
by American Express, which opposes the DOJ on this issue. The policy dichotomy does
not imply that only one group of nations has made an accurate analysis. In fact, reality
may t Figure 3 with countries that abolished the NSR lying on area A, while countries
that protect the NSR by law, or simply allow networks to impose the NSR on contracts,
lying on area B. According to our model, when deciding the NSR adoption or refusal,
policymakers should take into account (i) the degree of competition among merchants
( of the model) that characterizes the economy, and, (ii) the weight of the network
externality that merchants exert over cardholders relatively to consumer sensitiveness
towards membership fees. Di¤erent nations likely have di¤erent estimates of the two
determinants for the NSR refusal or adoption. Hence, our model is compatible with the
dichotomy on policy choice. In general, to set a uniform payment card policy worldwide
would not serve the social interest of each nation or region.
Both the elimination of restrictions on di¤erential pricing and laissez faire policies
have advantages and drawbacks; after arguing in favor of policy segmentation by coun-
try, we further argue in favor of policy customization by market. That is, policymakers
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should take into account merchantsmarket power, choosing the best policy on a market-
by-market basis instead of uniformly regulating all markets. More specically, when the
network e¤ect of merchants on cardholders is su¢ ciently weak (condition of NSR prof-
itability for networks) then policymakers should concentrate their e¤orts on implementing
the NSR only on less competitive markets where merchants do not pass-through the mar-
ginal cost of card usage to cardholders (see Remark 2). Just like di¤erent countries adopt
di¤erent policies, we propose the extension of this rationale to the industry level. When
one policy does not t all markets, then virtue lies in choosing the right policy that best
suits each individual industry.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we built a three-party model with consumers, merchants and electronic
payment networks. We extend the literature on electronic payment networks that sheds
light on the e¤ects of the No-Surcharge Rule on networkspricing, prots and social wel-
fare. We debate some possible policy interventions and claim that card payments should
be regulated on a market-by-market basis. For the sake of simplicity, our theoretical
model does not distinguish among di¤erent types of payment card (debit, credit, prepaid)
and may fail to capture important real-world features such as the role of credit that would
probably inuence the models results.
Our rst set of results relates to the seminal work of R&T (2003) extending its analysis
to include the e¤ect of a variation on network size. We show that the existence of net-
work e¤ects adds a specic cross elasticity term to the formula for optimal EPN pricing.
We derive a series of results based on elasticities showing that (i) the platforms prot
maximization problem can be decomposed in two steps: (1) setting the total fee level,
and (2) the relative fees, (ii) consumers demand for payment services becomes less elastic
with respect to merchant fee under the NSR, and (iii) the absence of surcharge variations
amongst EPNs holds back network competition resulting in higher total fee levels.
In a second set of results, we show rst that the NSR rebalances the relative fees in
favor to cardholders and against the merchants. We also investigate under which circum-
stances the NSR is a protable strategy for EPNs. We nd that the NSR increases EPNs
prots if and only if the cross-group externality exerted by merchants on cardholders is
su¢ ciently weak. The NSR inates merchant fees decreasing the merchant demand for
EPNs, therefore if the cross-group network e¤ect is strong, consumer demand and, by
implication, EPNsprots will both sharply decrease.
In the welfare analysis, we show that the NSR reduces the number of merchants
accepting card payments, increases the number of cardholders and raises the equilibrium
goods market price paid by cardholders. We investigate the surplus variations that the
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NSR implies to each group of agents and to society as a whole. We show that (i) merchants
market power  in the goods market and the (ii) network e¤ect exerted by merchants on
cardholders are two relevant determinants of whether the NSR is socially desirable or not.
We conclude from the welfare analysis that the answer to the question in the title, to
surcharge or not to surcharge?, has a bifurcation: a private answer to EPNs and a social
answer to policymakers. Regarding the EPNs decision making process all that matters
for the NSR implementation is the network e¤ect exerted by merchants on cardholders:
it must be su¢ ciently weak; otherwise EPNs would lose end-users on both sides of the
market. The social preference concerning the NSR is in general di¤erent because society
is concerned not only with the network e¤ect, but also with the merchants market power
in the goods market. For example, suppose that network e¤ects are strong to the point
that EPNs are unwilling to implement the NSR. Even in this case, it is still possible
for the NSR to be a socially desirable policy in nal goods markets characterized by
high market power. To take another example, suppose the network externality is weak
leading networks to nd the NSR implementation optimal, but if the goods market is very
competitive, society as a whole may prefer to abolish the NSR.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: First, note that the equilibrium price in market k satises k  pk 
v. On the one hand, if pk > v then no consumer will buy the good and the market shuts
down for that range of prices. On the other hand, if pk < k, no merchant will produce
the good since the price does not cover the net marginal cost k of supplying the good and
the market shuts down.
Second, the extreme values of pk are covered by function pk () when  = 0 and  = 1,
pk ( = 0) = k and pk ( = 1) = v.
Third, note that the function pk () : [0; 1] ! [k; v] is continuous in . Therefore
regarding the intermediate values of pk, pk (0) = k < p

k < v = pk (1), we can guarantee
by the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists at least one  2 [0; 1], such that
pk () = p

k.
Fourth, since dpk()
d
= v   k > 0 by assumption (iii), pk () is strictly increasing in 
and we can assure the uniqueness of  2 [0; 1] satisfying pk = v + (1  ) k, specically
 =
pk k
v k . 
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting fi by Dmi si in (9) and taking the log we get
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max
si;mi
lni = ln (si +mi) + lnD
m
i + lnD
c
i , i = 1; 2. (15)
26We assume log-concavity of the prot function (9). This assumption is su¢ cient to guarantee that
the FOCs dene a prot-maximizer.
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By the rst-order conditions of the problem in (15) we have8><>:
@ lni(si;mi)
@si
= 1
si+mi
+
dDci
dsi
Dci
= 0
@ lni(si;mi)
@mi
= 1
si+mi
+
dDmi
dmi
Dmi
+
dDci
dmi
Dci
= 0
,
(
si +mi =
si
"c
si +mi =
mi
"m+"c;m
. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
"c;m   dD
c
i
dmi
mi
Dci
=  

@Dci
@ (Npi)
@ (Npi)
@mi
+
@Dci
@Dmi
dDmi
dmi

mi
Dci
=
=   @D
c
i
@ (Npi)
Npi
Dci
:
@ (Npi)
@mi
mi
Npi
  @D
c
i
@Dmi
Dmi
Dci
:
dDmi
dmi
mi
Dmi
= "D
c;Np"Np;m + "D
c;Dm"m.
Therefore,
"m + "c;m = "m + "D
c;Np"Np;m + "D
c;Dm"m
= "m
 
1 + "D
c;Dm

+ "D
c;Np"Np;m.
Plugging the result into the system of optimal equations from Lemma 2, we reach the
result
(
si +mi =
si
"c
si +mi =
mi
"m+"c;m
,
8<: si +mi =
si
"c
si +mi =
mi
"m(1+"Dc;Dm)+"Dc;Np"Np;m
. 
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) From (12) we have
"c;m = "D
c;Np"Np;m + "D
c;Dm"m,
where under surcharging (S = 1),
"D
c;Np"Np;m =   @D
c
i
@ (Npi)
mi
Dci
@ (Npi)
@mi
> 0,
since @D
c
i
@(Npi) < 0 by assumption 1 and
@(Npi)
@mi
= @pi
@mi
> 0 by Lemma 1. Under the NSR
"D
c;Np"Np;m = 0 since prices must be equal regardless of the payment instrument. There-
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fore, the cross elasticity of consumers demand under the NSR, "c;mNSR, satises
"c;mNSR = "
Dc;Dm"m < "c;m.
(ii) From (10), and the fact that "c;mNSR < "
c;m, we can establish the following inequality,
sNSRi +m
NSR
i =
mi
"m + "c;mNSR
>
mi
"m + "c;m
= si +mi,
where sNSRi +m
NSR
i is the average total fee level per transaction under the NSR. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i) and (ii) come straight from solving the system of
simultaneous equations (13) with respect to (fi;mi). Provided that i = f

i D
c
i+m

iD
m
i D
c
i
by denition, and substituting mi and f

i by the optimal expressions from (i) and (ii),
respectively, we reach
i =  
dDmi
dmi
Dci +D
m
i

dDci
dmi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi

@Dci
@fi
dDmi
dmi
Dci +
dDci
dmi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi
dDmi
dmi
@Dci
@fi
Dmi D
c
i =
(Dci )
2
 @Dci
@fi
. 
Proof of Proposition 3: The NSR constraint S = 0 implies Npi = 0 and dD
c
i
dmi

NSR
=
@Dci
@mi
>
dDci
dmi
. Introducing dD
c
i
dmi

NSR
=
@Dci
@mi
in the system of simultaneous equations (13) and
solving w.r.t. (fi;mi), we get
mi jNSR =
@Dci
@mi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi
dDmi
dmi
@Dci
@fi
;
f i jNSR =  
dDmi
dmi
Dci +D
m
i

@Dci
@mi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi

@Dci
@fi
dDmi
dmi
:
Since @D
c
i
@mi
>
dDci
dmi
, then mi jNSR > mi and f i jNSR < f i . 
Proof of Proposition 4: From Proposition 2, (iii) we have i =
(Dci )
2
  @D
c
i
@fi
. Taking @D
c
i
@fi
as
constant by Assumption 3, it is clear that EPNs equilibrium prot will only increase if
more consumers access the network. Therefore, the NSR will be a protable strategy if the
number of consumers on the EPN increases. The variation on the number of consumers
on EPN i, Dci  Dci jNSR  Dci , is approximately given by
Dci 
@Dci
@mi
mi +
@Dci
@fi
fi,
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where mi  mi jNSR  mi and fi  f i jNSR   f i . Hence, the NSR is protable i¤
@Dci
@mi
mi +
@Dci
@fi
fi > 0, fi
mi
<  
@Dci
@mi
@Dci
@fi
.
Computing fi and mi,
fi  f i jNSR   f i =  
dDmi
dmi
Dci +D
m
i

@Dci
@mi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi

@Dci
@fi
dDmi
dmi
 
0@  dDmidmi Dci +Dmi

dDci
dmi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi

@Dci
@fi
dDmi
dmi
1A
=
Dmi

dDci
dmi
  @Dci
@mi

@Dci
@fi
dDmi
dmi
,
mi  mi jNSR  mi =
@Dci
@mi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi
dDmi
dmi
@Dci
@fi
 
dDci
dmi
  @Dci
@fi
Dmi
dDmi
dmi
@Dci
@fi
=
@Dci
@mi
  dDci
dmi
dDmi
dmi
@Dci
@fi
,
therefore,
fi
mi
=
Dmi

dDci
dmi
  @D
c
i
@mi

@Dc
i
@fi
dDm
i
dmi
@Dc
i
@mi
  dD
c
i
dmi
dDm
i
dmi
@Dc
i
@fi
=  Dmi ;
and the NSR will be a protable strategy i¤
fi
mi
<  
@Dci
@mi
@Dci
@fi
,  Dmi <  
@Dci
@mi
@Dci
@fi
, @D
c
i
@mi
> Dmi
@Dci
@fi
which is equivalent to @Dci@mi
 < @Dci@fi
Dmi . 
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 4: If both EPNs engage in the NSR strategy,
the variation on the number of consumers on EPN i, Dci  Dci jNSR   Dci , will be
approximately given by
Dci 
@Dci
@mi
mi +
@Dci
@fi
fi +
@Dci
@mj
mj +
@Dci
@fj
fj.
Under symmetry
mi = mj and fi = fj.
Hence,
Dci 

@Dci
@mi
+
@Dci
@mj

mi +

@Dci
@fi
+
@Dci
@fj

fi.
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By the denition in (4) and Nfi  fi   fj we can write that
@Dci
@ (Nfi)
=
@Dci
@fi
thus,
@Dci
@fj
 @D
c
i
@ (Nfi)
@ (Nfi)
@fj
=  @D
c
i
@fi
,
and similarly,
@Dci
@mj
=  @D
c
i
@mi
.
Hence,
Dci  (1  )

@Dci
@mi
mi +
@Dci
@fi
fi

where 1   > 0 and the NSR will be a protable strategy for both EPNs if
@Dci
@mi
mi +
@Dci
@fi
fi > 0,
which corresponds to the NSR protability condition for an EPN (see proof of Proposition
4). 
Proof of Proposition 5: (i)
Dmi  (1  )
dDmi
dmi
mi = (1  )
@Dci
@mi
  dDci
dmi
@Dci
@fi
< 0.
(ii)
Dci  (1  )

@Dci
@mi
mi +
@Dci
@fi
fi

=
=
(1  )

@Dci
@mi
 Dmi @D
c
i
@fi

@Dci
@mi
  dDci
dmi

@Dci
@fi
dDmi
dmi
> 0,
where @D
c
i
@fi
dDmi
dmi
> 0, @D
c
i
@mi
  dDci
dmi
> 0 and @D
c
i
@mi
  Dmi @D
c
i
@fi
> 0 by Proposition 4 (EPN
protability).
(iii)
pi = (1  )mi = (1  )
@Dci
@mi
  dDci
dmi
dDmi
dmi
@Dci
@fi
 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1: (i)
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Note thatpi  pNSRi  pi . Hence, pi = (1  ) [(1  ) (mi jNSR   b)  (mi   b)] =
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Proof of Lemma 4.2:
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Proof of Proposition 6: Condition
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Proof of Proposition 7: The result comes straightforward by the expression from
Lemma 4.2, equating it to zero and solve it while de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Proof of Proposition 8: Substituting  = 1 in the expression for the social indi¤erence
line (Proposition 7) we get
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this implies !Social  0. Therefore, when  = 1, the social indi¤erence equation has
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that is, assures the existence of a non-empty set of allocations in (;NE) 2 [0; 1]  R+0
where the NSR is socially desirable. In order to show the existence of a non-empty subset
of those allocations that is also protable to EPNs, consider the analysis for  = 1. Hence,
(i) society is better o¤ under the NSR i¤
0  NE  !Social and (16)
(ii) EPNs increase prots i¤
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where !Network  0. The intersection of the sets dened by inequalities (16) and (17) at
 = 1 is dened by
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	  0. Hence, the intersection is a non-empty subset of
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8.2 Platforms maximization problem
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derivatives. By Assumption 3 the demand functions Dci () and Dmi () are linear in their
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assuring that H is denite negative. Hence (mi ; f

i ) is a prot maximizer.
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